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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LEWIS RICKY YATES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950444-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment of conviction for any crime other
than a first degree felony or capital felony.

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following statutes is provided in
Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§
§

76-1-103 (1995)
76-3-204(1) & (2) (1995)
76-6-404 (1995)
76-6-412 (1995)
76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err in refusing to sentence Appellant
Lewis Ricky Yates ("Yates") for a class B misdemeanor where the
reduction in penalties under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp.
1995) was in effect at the time of his sentencing?

Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of
law which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
At sentencing, Yates argued that the legislative
amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, effective May 1, 1995,
should apply to his sentencing.

R. 133-34.

The trial judge

rejected Yates' argument and sentenced him for a class A
misdemeanor.

R. 81, 140-41.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Theft,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1995) .

Yates was charged by Information on November 22, 1994,

with one count of Theft, a third degree felony.

R. 5.

As part

of a plea bargain, Yates pled guilty on January 13, 1995, to one
count of Theft, a class A misdemeanor.

R. 17-24, 119-20.

At the sentencing hearing on June 28, 1995, Yates argued
that the legislative changes to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412,
effective May 1, 1995, required that he be sentenced for a
class B misdemeanor.

R. 133-34.

The trial court rejected Yates'

argument and sentenced him for a class A misdemeanor:

one year

in jail, $250 restitution, $500 recoupment fee to the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association, a $1000 fine, and an 85% surcharge.
R. 81 (commitment), 140-42.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State claimed that Yates committed a theft by
obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over the property of
Raylynn Coumier with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof and
that the value of the property was more than $250 and not more
than $1000.

R. 05.

On January 13, 1995, as part of a plea bargain, Yates
pled guilty to Theft, a class A misdemeanor.

R. 17-24, 119-20.

See Addendum B for transcript of R. 17-24, 119-20.

The State

amended the Information to theft, a class A misdemeanor, with
said property having a value of more than $100 but not more than
$250.

R. 05, 112.

See Addendum B for copy of Amended

Information.
The trial court set the case for sentencing on
February 17, 1995.

R. 121.

Yates was subsequently released from

jail and failed to appear at sentencing.

R. 33.

Yates was

present for a hearing on March 13, 1995, at which time the trial
court continued sentencing to April 14, 1995.

R. 44.

On

April 14, 1995, Yates again failed to appear in court for
sentencing and the trial court issued another no bail bench
warrant.

R. 48.

On June 2, 1995, while Yates was present for

another hearing, the trial court reset sentencing for June 28,
1995.

R. 55.
On June 28, 1995, the trial court sentenced Yates for a

class A misdemeanor:

one year in jail, $250 restitution, $500

recoupment fee to the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, a
3

$1000 fine, and an 85% surcharge.

R. 81 (commitment), 140-42.

At sentencing, Yates argued that he was entitled to a reduction
in penalty based on the legislative changes to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-412 which make the theft of property having a value of
less than $300 a class B misdemeanor.

R. 132-34.

The trial

court rejected Yates' argument and sentenced him for a class A
misdemeanor under the former theft statute.

R. 140-41.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to
sentence Yates for a class B misdemeanor.

Prior to Yates'

sentencing, the amended theft statute had gone into effect.
Pursuant to that amended statute, the actions which Yates
admitted doing when he entered his guilty plea amounted to a
class B misdemeanor.

Regardless of whether Yates was responsible

for a delay in sentencing, controlling case law and the
legislative intent behind the amendment required that the trial
judge sentence Yates under the lesser penalty of the statute in
effect at the time of sentencing.

This case should be remanded

for imposition of a legal and correct sentence.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REFUSING TO SENTENCE YATES PURSUANT TO THE LESSER
PENALTIES IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF HIS SENTENCING.
The legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412,
effective May 1, 1995.

The amendment raised the value of
4

property applicable for each classification of theft offense.
Relevant portions of the version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412
which went into effect May 1, 1995 state:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided
in this chapter shall be punishable: . . . (c)
as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen is or exceeds $3 00 but is less
than $1,000; or (d) as a class B misdemeanor if
the value of the property stolen is less than
$300.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
The previous version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1995)
which was in effect at the time Yates entered his plea stated in
pertinent part:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided
in this chapter shall be punishable: . . . (c)
as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was more than $100 but does not
exceed $250 . . . .
Although Yates entered his plea when this previous version was in
effect, at the time of Yates' sentencing, the current version of
the statute had taken effect.
Yates pled guilty to theft of property having a value of
more than $100 but not more than $250.

R. 17-18.

judge ordered Yates to pay $250 in restitution.
1

The trial
R. 81.x

The actual value of the property was never established in
the record. The prosecutor who appeared at the plea hearing stated
that the restitution amount which apparently appeared in his file
was $1235. R. 111. Defense counsel disagreed with that amount and
indicated that a restitution hearing might be necessary. R. 112.
A restitution hearing was not held. Instead, at sentencing, the
trial judge ordered that restitution in the amount of $250 be paid.
R. 81. Even if a restitution hearing had been held, the nature of
the plea rather than the amount of restitution would have
controlled. See People v. Palmer, 595 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Colo. App.
1979) .
5

In Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971), the Supreme
Court considered circumstances almost identical to those in the
present case.

The Belt Court held that the defendant was

entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment which was in
effect at the time of the defendant's sentencing.
The defendant in Belt pled guilty to issuing a fraudulent
check in the amount of $10.

The trial judge placed the defendant

on probation without imposing sentence.
by leaving the state.

Belt violated probation

Almost a year after the trial court

initially placed Belt on probation, Belt was brought before the
court and sentenced.

In the interim, the punishment for the

crime committed by Belt had been statutorily reduced from a
maximum of five years in prison to a maximum of six months in

In concluding that Belt was entitled to the reduced
punishment which was in effect at the time of sentencing, the
Court stated:
After the plaintiff had entered a plea of guilty
to the charge made against him and prior to the
imposition of sentence in this matter, the
legislature amended the law so as to provide that
the offense here charged against the plaintiff is
punishable by a fine or imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than six months. A new
policy having been adopted by the legislature
concerning the punishment for the offense we are
here concerned with it should inure to the
defendant's benefit even though the offense had
been committed and the plea thereto made prior to
the amendatory legislation.
Belt, 479 P.2d at 792.
The Belt Court relied on the rationale of the New York
6

Court of Appeals in People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956),
where the Court stated:
This application of statutes reducing punishment
accords with the best modern theories concerning
the functions of punishment in criminal law.
According to these theories, the punishment or
treatment of criminal offenders is directed
toward one or more of three ends:
(1) to
discourage and act as a deterrent upon future
criminal activity, (2) to confine the offender so
that he may not harm society and (3) to correct
and rehabilitate the offender. There is no place
in the scheme for punishment for its own sake,
the product simply of vengeance or retribution,
[citations omitted]. A legislative mitigation of
the penalty for a particular crime represents a
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or
the different treatment is sufficient to meet the
legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is
to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty
after such a pronouncement; the excess in
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose
other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance. As
to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to
assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the
legislative design that the lighter penalty
should be imposed in all cases that subsequently
reach the courts.
Belt, 479 P.2d at 793 (quoting Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02).
In State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 1971), the Supreme
Court reiterated that where a statute reducing the penalty
becomes effective before sentencing, the defendant is entitled to
be sentenced under the lesser penalty.

See also Shelmidine v.

Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1976); State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d
1340, 1342 (Utah 1974).

In other words, a defendant must be

sentenced in accordance with the law at the time of sentencing.
Id. at 336.

The Tapp Court noted three considerations behind

such a rule:

7

[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature,
expressing the will of the people, to fix the
penalties for crimes and the courts should give
effect to the enactment and the effective date
thereof as so declared . . . [T]o insist on the
prior existing harsher penalty is a refusal to
accept and keep abreast of the process which has
been continuing over the years of ameliorating
and modifying the treatment of antisocial
behavior by changing the emphasis from vengeance
and punishment to treatment and rehabilitation.
In the same tenor are the time-honored rules of
the criminal law generally favorable to one
accused of a crime: that in case of doubt or
uncertainty as to the degree of crime, he is
entitled to the lesser; and correlated thereto:
that as to an alternative between a severe or a
lenient punishment, he is entitled to the latter.
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336.
State v. Miller, 464 P.2d 844 (Utah 1970), is
distinguishable from the decisions in Belt and Tapp in that
Miller was sentenced prior to the effective date of the new
statute.

The sentence imposed prior to a change in the law is

therefore imposed in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of sentencing and should stand.

Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336.

In cases where an amendment reducing the criminal penalty
becomes effective prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court has
"consistently held that in such situations, 'the law in force at
the time of sentencing govern[s] . . .'"

Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d

788, 792 (Utah 1990) (quoting Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343, 344
(Utah 1975)) (emphasis in original).

See also Saxton, 519 P.2d

at 1342 (defendant is entitled to lesser punishment if penalty
for offense is reduced before imposition of sentence).
Courts from other jurisdictions have also held that a
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment
8

where the change in the law takes effect prior to sentencing.
See, e.g., In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1965) ("If the
amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior
to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final then, in our
opinion, it, and not the old statute in effect when the
prohibited act was committed, applies."); In re Kirk, 408 P.2d
962 (Cal. 1965) (where statute was amended prior to sentencing by
ameliorating the punishment, defendant was entitled to benefit of
amended statute); In re Daup, 408 P.2d 957, 958 (Cal. 1965)
(same); People v. Thomas, 525 P.2d 1136 (Colo. 1974) (same).
In Estrada, the court explained the rationale behind the
rule requiring a defendant to be given the benefit of a lesser
punishment which is in effect at the time of sentencing.

The

court pointed out that because the legislature had determined
that a lesser penalty was appropriate for the crime at issue, it
is an "inevitable inference" that such lesser punishment should
be applied even if the crime was committed prior to the effective
date of the new statute.
When the legislature amends a statute so as to
lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly
determined that its former penalty was too severe
and that a lighter punishment is proper as a
punishment for the commission of the prohibited
act. It is an inevitable inference that the
Legislature must have intended that the new
statute imposing the new lighter penalty now
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every
case to which it constitutionally could apply.
Estrada, 408 P.2d at 951.
The Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412
based on a recognition that the property value classifications in
9

the statute had not been amended in twenty years, and that the
amendment would help ensure that only the most serious theft
offenders would be sentenced to prison.

See 51st Leg., Gen.

Sess., H.B. 159 (Tape #2, February 9, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Ellertson); 51st Leg., Gen. Sess., H.B. 159 (Tape #44,
February 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hillyard) contained in
Addendum C.

The statute itself and legislative history contained

in Addendum C demonstrate that the legislature determined that
the former penalties were too severe.

The "inevitable inference"

is that the statute should apply to cases in which the defendant
is sentenced after the effective date of the amendments.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) also suggests that the
statute in effect at the time of sentencing should apply.

It

states:
Any offense committed prior to the effective date
of this code shall be governed by the law,
statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time
of commission thereof, except that a defense or
limitation on punishment available under this
code shall be available to any defendant tried or
retried after the effective date. An offense
under the laws of this state shall be deemed to
have been committed prior to the effective date
of this act if any of the elements of the offense
occurred prior thereto.
Yates argued that he should be sentenced for a class B
misdemeanor in accordance with the statute in effect at the time
of sentencing.

R. 133-34.

The trial judge rejected that

argument, stating that it was his "own failures to appear that
delayed the process."

R. 133.

The court also stated:

I will sentence the defendant on the class A
misdemeanor, which is what he plead to, which is
10

consistent with the facts as he represented them
to me at the change of plea, and it is also
consistent with the law that was in effect at the
time he entered his plea. And I will also note,
once again, that the reason he was not sentenced
on February 17th is because he chose to absent
himself from the proceedings. The reason he was
not sentenced on April 14th is that, once again,
he chose to absent himself from the proceedings.
R. 14 0.

The trial court determined not to sentence Yates to a

class B misdemeanor because the court found it not "appropriate
under the facts, under the law, under the totality of the
circumstances."

R. 141.

The trial court's conclusion is incorrect.

Yates pled

guilty to theft of property valued at more than $100 and not more
than $250.

R. 17-18, 119-20; see Addendum B.

This clearly fits

within the class B misdemeanor limits under the version of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 in effect at the time of sentencing.
Yates' failure to appear on prior sentencing dates is
irrelevant in analyzing this issue.

First, the record fails to

establish the reason for Yates' absence.

Hence, there is no

showing that Yates knowingly and voluntarily absented himself
from court.

Although Yates was present at sentencing, the court

made no attempt to ascertain the reason for his absence.
Second, even if Yates had voluntarily failed to appear,
he had already been penalized by being held without bail.
55.

R. 48,

In addition, the trial judge refused to give him credit for

time served due to his failures to appear.

R. 141. Furthermore,

the criminal code sets forth the crime of Bail Jumping in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-312 (1995).

To be convicted of that crime, the
11

State must file additional charges and prove the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.2
case.

The State has not offered such proof in this

The trial judge incorrectly imposed a sentence greater

than the statutory maximum class B misdemeanor sentence based on
unproven conduct extraneous to the elements of the theft crime
charged.

See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),

overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)
(double jeopardy precludes multiple punishment for single
offense).
Finally, case law is contrary to the trial judge's
conclusion.

The rationale behind the decisions holding that the

lesser punishment must be ordered applies regardless of whether a
defendant voluntarily avoided sentencing.

See, e.g., Belt, 479

P.2d 791; Palmer, 595 P.2d at 1062.
In at least one Utah case, the defendant's sentencing
occurred after the effective date of the statute due to the
defendant's violation of a court order by leaving the state.
Although the defendant's actions caused the delay in sentencing,
the Utah Supreme Court nevertheless gave him the benefit of the
lesser punishment.

See Belt, 479 P.2d 791.

While the Belt Court

did not directly address the issue of whether a defendant who is
responsible for the delay in sentencing is entitled to the
benefit of a lesser penalty which is in effect at the time of

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-20a-l et seq. (1995) sets forth the
Bail Forfeiting Procedure. This is an additional punishment for
defendants who bail out and later fail to appear.
12

sentencing, the decision in Belt implicitly directs that the
defendant's responsibility is irrelevant.
In In re Fink, 433 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1967), the defendant
pled guilty to escaping from a prison camp.

Prior to judgment

and sentence on the matter, defendant escaped from the county
jail.

At the time of the guilty plea, the penalty for escape was

a minimum of one year and a maximum of life.

However, at the

time of sentencing, the legislature had amended the sentence to a
minimum of six months and a maximum of five years.
The State argued that the defendant's conduct extended
the prosecution past the effective date of the new law and the
defendant should therefore not benefit from the new legislation.
The court rejected that argument, pointing out that wrongful
conduct was immaterial and that the argument ignored the basic
rationale for giving a defendant the benefit of the change in the
law:
When the legislature amends a statute so as to
lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly
determined that its former penalty was too severe
and that a lighter punishment is proper as
punishment for the commission of the prohibited
act. It is an inevitable inference that the
legislature must have intended that the new
statute imposing the new lighter penalty now
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every
case to which it constitutionally could apply.
Fink, 433 P.2d at 162 (quoting Estrada, 408 P.2d at 951).
In Palmer, 595 P.2d 1060, the defendant pled guilty to
possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana, which at the
time carried a penalty of two to fifteen years imprisonment and a
maximum fine of $10,000.

The defendant failed to appear for
13

sentencing on several occasions over a four-year period.

When

the defendant was finally sentenced, the penalty for possession
of over one-half ounce of marijuana had changed to a maximum $100
fine.
The Palmer court held that the trial judge erred in not
sentencing Palmer pursuant to the statute in effect at the time
of sentencing.

The court determined that Palmer's statement as

to how much marijuana he had was irrelevant.

Instead, the nature

of the crime to which Palmer pled guilty controlled.
P.2d at 1062.

Palmer, 595

The court reasoned that "'a defendant is entitled

to the benefits of amendatory legislation when the relief is
sought before finality has attached to the judgment of
conviction.'"

Palmer, 595 P.2d at 1062 (quoting Glazier v.

People, 565 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1977)).

The court also noted that

"[f]inality cannot attach to a judgment until sentencing occurs."
Palmer, 595 P.2d at 1062.
In the present case, as in Palmer, the nature of the
crime to which Yates pled guilty controls the sentence to be
imposed.

The crime to which Yates pled guilty involved

unauthorized control over property "valued between $100 and
$250."

See Addendum B.

Under the amended statute in effect at

the time of Yates7 sentencing, the trial judge should have
sentenced Yates for a class B misdemeanor.

The trial judge erred

in concluding that the statute in effect at sentencing did not
apply because Yates was responsible for the delay in sentencing.
Controlling case law, the legislative intent behind the
14

amendment, and case law from other jurisdictions establish that
the trial judge erred in sentencing Yates for a class A
misdemeanor rather than the lesser punishment under the statute
in effect at the time of sentencing.

REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED
AND AN OPINION ISSUED
Oral argument should be granted and a published opinion
issued.

A published opinion would clarify that the amendments to

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 apply regardless of whether the
defendant is responsible for a delay in sentencing.

Oral

argument would aid in fully analyzing the issue.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court remand
this case with an order directing the trial court to enter a
correct sentence.

SUBMITTED this * ? /

day of October, 1995.

JO^N C. WATT
T
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

REBECCA HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
October, 1995.

DELIVERED this

day of October, 1995.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-1-103. Application of code — Offense prior to effective
date.
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense
defined outside this code; provided such offense was committed after the
effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or retried
after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall be deemed
to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.
History: C. 1963, 76-1-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-103.

76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction — Term of imprisonment.
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to
imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one
year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six
months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety
days.

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
^ A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

76-6-412, Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
O^cj^N
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop^ erty.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
•
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
\
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
1
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;'
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
J
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
2
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-.
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the,
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
*

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
($>uop. l^S^trcbk damages against receiver of stolen property*
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less
than $5,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less
than $300.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, 9 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, 9 18;
1975, ch. 48, 9 1; 1977, ch. 89, 9 1; 1989, ch.
78, 9 I; 1995, ch. 291, 9 14.

Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, increased the
value amounts in Subsections (IXaXi), (lXbXi),
(1XO, and (IXdl

ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL !&?$&$<*

MIIT
Third Judicial District

STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

,.„«•-«
JAN 1 3 1995

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT,
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL,
AND ORDER

Deputy CJw*

v.

Case No. ISft
Defendant.

JUDGE

{WiVS

FS

\j{^

JMs&tlT/^M/n

COMES NOW,

, the defendant in this

case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s):

CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION
A.

jk4h
Ltf.lU-AtA

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT

tk* ti
}/l/u<^//^/vO

B.

C.

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information! against me, I have read it,
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which ! am pleading
(guilty) (no contest).

000011

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:

t^jL

^'J^JAlti^

J/JAAJ.^J

1*4*Mjft^j£sMf//^kf

My
liable,
Mv conduct, aricj
and the "cofiduct
conduct of other persons (for which I am criminally liable.
that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows:

^

YyWJ^dr^ tfoi&ynj d^^,/

I

am

entering

this/these

plea(s)

Mo

voluntarily

AJ«/p—

and with

knowledge

and

understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I

cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

oooois

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and

understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty.
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
/ t^ffi^>f^J

»

and

'

have

ha

d ^

opportunity to discuss this

statement my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to
testify in court upon by behalf.
7. I know that 1 have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do
so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not
guilty11 and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if 1 were tried and convicted
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by

3
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the state.
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to
which I plead (guilty)^(no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an
offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to
serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences

"yul
may be consecutive and may be for a^serrt&rm, fine, or both. I know that in addition
to a fine an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated §6363a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make
restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know
that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the
conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13. My plea(s) of (guilty^ (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of
this plea bargain, if any, are futfy contained in the Plea-Agfeement attached to this-

(!JU^

"
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14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty) (no
contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea.
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe
the court may do are also not binding on the Court.
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the
attached plea agreement, have been made to me.
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and
I understand its provisions.

I know that I am free to change or delete anything

contained in this statement

I do not wish to make any changes because ail of the

statements are correct.
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. I am

/y^y

years of age; I have attended school through gtff

,
u

jgasie-and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I
am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which
impair my judgment
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

5
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understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

\^P

day of

^^UjJdJk^Li

.«££

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for

^/Ljyp]u^l^(

[I\AAL&

the

defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To
the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

Z

^Z£L2^

ATtfiRflEY F0R] DEFENDANT/BAf* #

0 00G 2 £

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against

I

*=r

. defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the

defendant and find that \the declarations, including the elements of the offense of the
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes
the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to
encourage a plea have been offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully

contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on
record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are
entered and acceptance of the piea^woMd serve the public interest

blltlNG ATTORNEYJBAR #

7
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ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of
the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the
defendant's ptea of (guflty) (no contest) fs free/y and vofuntarffy made and it is so
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the
statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

8
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the cost.

You give up those rights in pleading guilty.

Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do.

Have any promises or inducements

been made to you to cause you to plead guilty today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, ma'am.

You know I'm not bound by the

favorable recommendations that the state may make.

Do you

understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do.

I'll do what I feel is appropriate,

given all of the facts and circumstances.

And you know

that if I don't give you a sentence you want or expect,
that's not the basis for withdrawing your plea.

Do you

understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do.

Having all of these rights in mind,

sir, I'm going to ask you now how you plead to theft, a
class A misdemeanor, occurring at 1260 West Pacific
Avenue, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
October 22nd, '94, in violation of 76-6-404 of the code,
in that you, as a defendant and a party, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of
Raylynn Coumier, with the purpose to deprive the owner
thereof, and that the value of the property was more than

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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$100, but less than $250, How do you plead?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

Your plea of guilty is received and

entered as a conviction at this time.

In entering the

same as a conviction, the court finds the plea is knowing,
voluntary, freely entered, and intelligently entered, with
a full understanding of the legal consequences.
I base that finding upon statements of counsel,
the defendant's statements, orally and in his written
statement or affidavit, and the fact that the defendant
has heard at least one other change of plea.
that record by interlineation.

I referenced

He's indicated he paid

attention, I observed him to be paying attention.
Most importantly, I base this upon my careful
observation of his appearance and demeanor.

I find that

he is intelligent, and paid careful attention.
You now have two other rights that come into
play.

One of the those is the right to be sentenced in no

less than two and no more than thirty days.

You also have

the right to seek to withdraw a plea of guilty if you have
the legal basis for doing so, within thirty days of
entering the plea.

That thirty days starts to run today.

Do you understand those rights?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do.

It seems that a presentence report

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ERNEST W. JONES, Bar No. 1736
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by:
Assigned t o :

THE STATE OF UTAH,

E. JONES
E. JONES

Plaintiff,
BAIL:

$15,000.00
I N F O R M A T I O N

-vsLOUIS RICKY YATES,
DOB 9 / 3 / 6 9
OTN

&

Defendant.

•

Case No.

FS

The undersigned Det. Jann Farris - Salt Lake City Police
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, committed the crime of:
COUNT I
^ ^ ft W W '
THEFT, a Third—Degree Felony, at 1260 West Pacific Avenue, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 22,
1994, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
LOUIS RICKY YATES, a party to the offense, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Raylynn
Coumier with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and
that the value of said property was more than $250»00,- but
not more than $-1,000*00;%,
/frC^chs

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Jann Farris, Raylynn Coumier, Thomas Romero and Karen Kelly.

u

%

J> \J

V

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH V. LOUIS RICKY YATES
County Attorney No. 94 012078
Page 2

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant based this information on police report no. 94154530.
The defendant had been living at Raylynn Courtlier1 s home.
The defendant moved out on October 22, 1994.
Thomas Romero
helped the defendant move.
Ms. Coumier discovered property
valued at over $700.00 was missing from her home after the
defendant left. Ms. Coumier spoke to Mr. Romero. He told her
that he moved the missing property for the defendant but was lead
to believe that it belonged to the defendant. The defendant was
not authorized to take the property.

DET. J.
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before
me this
2~~^ day of November,
1994.

Authorized for presentment and filing: \ 'Vj^-<o° ^

RCBIN W. REESE

DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney

Deputy County
November 22,
msy/94 012078
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ADDENDUM C

LEGISLATIVE DEBATE ON HOUSE BILL 159 (1995)
SPONSORED BY R. LEE ELLERTSON

HOUSE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 25--FEBRUARY 9, 1995
REPRESENTATIVE R. LEE ELLERTSON SPEAKING
TAPE #2 STARTING AT 2116
Rep. Ellertson:

. . .We're bringing the property crimes in
line with current policy of the state . . .
We've made some changes in the property crimes.
And let me call to your attention the matrix
that has been handed out to you that I think
would more clearly describe these theft
statutes. The amounts of money which are used
to distinguish between levels of theft and
property crimes haven't been adjusted in twenty
years. This makes an attempt to do that. And
it shows you in the 1974 code where it was last
amended and applies the consumer index and then
also the recommendations in this statute.
Those changes appear on page 11 of the bill.
The value of stolen property makes a class A
misdemeanor when the theft equals $100 and that
brings that up now to $300. The amount for a
third degree felony, $250, brings it up now to
$1,000 and so on. I think the committee has
gone through some very painstaking processes to
see that these different kinds of property
offenses are now consistent with the rest of
the code. Forgery and illegal use of financial
transaction card offenses have been made a
third degree felony offense. This is because
they attack the victim's name or his reputation
or her reputation. The actual money that is
then taken is punished according to the value
of the theft. So you would have two chargesone for forgery, then one for the value of the
money that has been taken from you. I think
this really is a welcome step when it comes to
bringing us in line with current day statutes.
The bill is a responsible effort, in my
opinion, to use our correctional facilities,
get the biggest bang for the dollar out of
those correctional facilities, put people in
there who really deserve to be there, and find
us a suitable alternative to those who really
don't need to be in that setting. The bill has
been endorsed by the Utah Sentencing

Commission, the Commission on Criminal and
Juvenile Justice, Law Enforcement Legislative
Committee, and the Statewide Association of
Prosecutors. And, of course, as you heard a
moment ago, the bill was unanimously approved
through the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
Mr. Speaker, that concludes my presentation of
the bill.

SENATE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 44--FEBRUARY 28, 1995
SENATOR HILLYARD SPEAKING
TAPE #44 STARTING AT 1202
Sen. Hillyard:

. . . Then with the property crimes, we've
always distinguished the levels of theft, like
burglary, etc., based on the values of the
property. And that was set back in 1973.
Currently the value of property, if it's over
$100, was a class A misdemeanor. We've raised
that to $300. For a third degree felony, we've
raised the value from $250 to $1,000. We've
gone through the process of changing those and
upgrading the values to make them more in
keeping than the values of 1973. We've also
taken forgery and the illegal use of financial
credit cards . . . .
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